Globalizing Capital: A History of the. International Monetary A major theme of Barry Eichengreen’s accessible history of the internationa etary system since. Eichengreen, B.: Globalizing Capital: a. System. IX, pp. Princeton Univer. US $ Barry Eichengreen at his best: his lat international monetary system. “Eichengreen’s purpose is to provide a brief history of the international monetary system. In this, he succeeds magnificently. Globalizing Capital will become a.
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Would a hypothetical expansionary monetary policy in to have driven the United States off gold?
I’ll certainly admit that if I had taken the time to review the macroeconomic concepts involved here, which I have learned at least twice before, I probably would’ve gotten more out of the book. Want to Read saving…. When the public-sector share of national income is one-tenth, the burden of economic contraction that in some circumstances is required under the gold standard can be spread across a private sector accounting for 90 percent of national income. Fixed exchange eichengrreen and unfettered capital mobility, after all, characterized the gold-standard regime.
Since the s, there has been further growth of highly mobile capital flows and a deepening of international capital markets. In Western Europe, after the failure of the European Snake of the s and the disappointments of the European Monetary System of the s and early s, the countries of the European Union are engaged in an effort to form a monetary union centered on Germany, with what success the next few years will reveal. To ask other readers questions about Globalizing Capitalplease sign glogalizing.
View all 3 comments. No trivia or quizzes yet. The glossary in the back is overly detailed for me, but certainly of help for the average reader. It isn’t entirely clear to me what the optimal cooperation scenario here with look like or how it would be superior to the absence of a consistent trend; devaluation seems to be a country specific strategy applied to deal with internal problems.
In any case, Eichengreen’s analysis is far more detailed than my sketch, and he lays his arguments out very convincingly. Eichengreen recognizes that at the domestic level, no policy consensus may globaliizing. When the era ended, the controls had been eroded by the emergence of liquid international financial markets. What was critical for the successful maintenance of fixed exchange rates during that period was the fact that governmentswere relatively insulated from democratic politics and thus from pressure to trade off exchange rate globalizkng for other goals, such as the reduction of unemployment.
Goodreads helps you keep track of books you want to read. Preview — Globalizing Capital by Barry Eichengreen. Thereafter, demand for gold coin and certificates soared, reflecting domestic fear of devaluation and speculative purchases of sterling, as the incoming Roosevelt administration raised doubts about its commitment to g,obalizing existing gold parity.
Gonnamakeit rated it really liked it Nov 27, That said, I definitely got what I wanted ekchengreen terms of background and examples on the gold standard for my current project.
The book capitap the evolution of preferences for different kinds of exchange-rate arrangements by countries against the background of swings in the behavior of their exchange rates. By Januarythanks to gold inflows after Augustthe stock exceeded its initial level.
Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital
Is that all there is to it? The last section of the book discusses the current, free-floating and uncoordinated system of free trade and fast finance. The implication globalising undeniable: It has become increasingly apparent that one cannot understand the international economy without knowing how its monetary system operates. However, he shows that capital mobility was also high prior to World War I, yet this did not prevent the maintenance of fixed exchange rates.
Tom rated it liked it Feb 24, In addition, by the spring of foreign czpital against U. Instead, speculators could commit arbitrage by buying gold where it was cheaper due to a decline in the exchange rate for whatever reasonand selling it where it was more expensive.
Not only the U. Under the pre gold standard, governments of the industrialized countries were committed to preserving external stability even at the cost of internal stability.
Eichengreen and those who share his views hold that expansionary Federal Reserve action was precluded for another reason. Eichengreen analyzes the shift from pegged to floating exchange rates in the s and ascribes eichejgreen change to the growing capital mobility that has made pegged rates difficult to maintain.
Feb 15, Ajay rated it really liked it Shelves: Nov 05, Nick Geiser rated it it was amazing Shelves: This view finds no support in the case of the Federal Reserve system. I almost wish he’d written a series of books covering each of the chapters in this book. Usually, the problem is that I want mechanistic hypotheses that the available data can’t evaluate.
Eichengreen’s work demonstrates that insights into the international monetary system and effective principles for governing it capotal result only if it is seen a historical phenomenon extending from the gold standard period to interwar instability, then to Bretton Woods, and finally to the post period of fluctuating currencies.
Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System
Globalizing Capital is intended not only for economists but also for a general audience of historians, political scientists, professionals in government and business, and anyone with a broad interest in international economic and political relations.
A History of the International Monetary System. Eichengreen rejects the proposition that the demise of the pegged-exchange-rate Capiital Woods system and the subsequent shift to fluctuating exchange rates are cpital attributable to the resurgence of capital mobility. They could either let the eichengreenn rate float, and let ‘come what may’, or they could peg their currency to one of the other big currencies. Then there are cases like Austria at the beginning of the Great Depression, a bank failure that might have been bailed out by other countries to protect the international gold standard if those other countries were not recent factors of a bitter war.
Eichengreen makes frequent allusion to the fact that countries could easily devalue their currency without setting off the spiral of exchange rate drops if they just did it together, but apparently that has essentially never happened. LDCs gloobalizing tried to reduce high inflation rates by unilaterally pegging the nominal exchange rate as a nominal anchor in a stabilization program.
Zeeshan rated it it was amazing Mar 04, He is a regular monthly columnist for Project Syndicate.